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Abstract 
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requirements for the Degree of Master of Commerce and Management. 
Abstract 
The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks on 
New Zealand’s Exchange Rate 
 
by 
Yingjie Lin 
 
This thesis examines the impact of monetary policy shock on the exchange rate in New 
Zealand. Monetary policy shock is the unexpected change in monetary policy that is 
determined by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). Since March 1999, RBNZ has 
adopted Official Cash Rate (OCR) to be the monetary policy instrument. An increasing 
on OCR indicates monetary policy contraction from RBNZ. The empirical analyses are 
conducted using the models due to Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns & Manners (2006) that 
can be estimated by OLS. Monetary policy shocks are identified by the reactions of both 
30-day and 90-day interest rates to OCR announcements.  The sample period is from 
1999 through 2010.  The result indicates that there is no exchange rate puzzle in New 
Zealand. In addition, the monetary policy shocks have no significant impact on New 
Zealand’s exchange rate.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
New Zealand is a small, open economy with a significant tradable sector. Consequently, 
fluctuations in the exchange rate can have large macroeconomic impacts. The exchange 
rate in this thesis refers to the amount of foreign currency that is required to purchase one 
unit of domestic currency. For example, if the current exchange rate between New 
Zealand Dollar (NZD) and United State Dollar (USD) is listed as 0.7124, this means that 
71 cents of USD are needed to exchange for one NZD.  
 
Figure 1 shows New Zealand’s exchange rate with the United States Dollar in nominal 
terms (that is, not adjusting for inflation differences between the two countries) between 
1990 and 2010. This shows that the exchange rate can fluctuate over a wide range. The 
most notable period is from 2004 to 2008, during which the exchange rate stayed relative 
high, hovering between 0.6 and 0.83, compared with the preceding 5-year period when it 
had stayed below 0.5.  During periods of high exchange rates, exporters and 
manufacturers competing against imports often complain that the Reserve Bank’s 
monetary policy is unnecessarily contributing to the high value.  
2 
 
 
Figure 1: The New Zealand Nominal Exchange Rate, 1990-2010 
 
This thesis will explain the impact of monetary policy shocks on the New Zealand 
exchange rate. It focuses on a particular question; sometimes termed the exchange rate 
puzzle. An exchange rate puzzle is said to exist while increased money supply causes a 
domestic currency to appreciate.   Sims (1992) found conflicting results regarding 
monetary policy shocks and exchange rates. Although applying the same methodology, 
his results indicated the existence of exchange rate puzzles in both France and Germany, 
while there was no evidence of an exchange rate puzzle in Japan, United Kingdom, and 
the USA. The possible existence of exchange rate puzzles has made the effect of 
monetary policy shocks on exchange rates ambiguous and intriguing. Eichenbaum and 
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Evans (1995), Cushman and Zha (1997), Bonser-Neal, Roley, and Gordon (1998), and 
Kim and Roubini (2000), among others, have also examined the relationship between 
monetary policy shocks and exchange rate movements in different countries, applying 
different methodologies. This thesis will therefore study the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on the New Zealand exchange rate and test whether an exchange rate puzzle exists 
in New Zealand. The rest of this chapter will provide some context for this study, 
introduce the study’s major research questions, and outline the structure of the thesis.   
 
Among the existing literature, the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate 
have been varied. The results are even conflicting in some cases. In general, there are two 
possible directions that the effects could be in: one as predicted by the standard theory 
and the other the opposite, namely, a puzzle. According to standard theory, monetary 
expansion will increase money supply to the market. The expansionary monetary policy 
is normally implemented by increasing the base money, reducing the central bank’s 
interest rate or raising the level of non-borrowed reserves. As money supply increases, the 
exchange rate with other currencies should decrease: as supply increases, price reduces. 
However, the real world has no shortage of evidence pointing to the existence of a 
contrary. For example, the existence of exchange rate puzzles. 
 
While there are many studies on the effect of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate, 
the effects have been found to vary from country to country and from time to time. The 
results also seem to depend on the methodology used. Research on whether the exchange 
rate puzzle exists in New Zealand has received very limited attention since New Zealand 
adopted the Official Cash Rate (OCR) as the new monetary policy instrument in March 
1999. According to Mabin (2010), New Zealand exchange rate fluctuations have been 
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significantly influenced by the expected return on New Zealand dollar, and the interest 
rate is one of the most important factors that directly control the return on holding New 
Zealand dollars in the banks. Thus a close relationship is expected between the market 
interest rates and the exchange rates in New Zealand. Adjustments to the OCR can lead to 
changes in retail interest rates and so affect the New Zealand exchange rate. This thesis 
will focus on the immediate effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates in New 
Zealand during the past decade. The immediateness aims to exclude or minimise other 
factors that are also likely to affect the exchange rate.  
 
1.2 Background  
New Zealand is a developed country with a small open economy. According to Evans et 
al. (1996), the economic reforms from 1984 to 1996 have had a significant influence on 
New Zealand’s current economy.  The reforms included a series of changes in the 
taxation system, the labour market, trade liberalization, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. 
Through these changes, New Zealand now has an enhanced business environment and a 
deregulated open market economy. With its small open market economy and floating 
exchange rate system, the exchange rate can have a large impact on New Zealand’s 
economy and international trade. At the same time, it is important for the monetary 
authorities to control inflation within a desired range to maintain stable economic growth.  
To focus on the effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in New Zealand, 
it is therefore important to clarify these three sectors first: The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, the Official Cash Rate and the exchange rate.      
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1.2.1 The Reserve Bank, Official Cash Rate, and Exchange Rate 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) is the central bank of New Zealand, 
established in 1934and completely owned by New Zealand government since 1936. Since 
the major reforms in 1989, the primary responsibility of the RBNZ is to implement 
monetary policy to maintain the stability of the general price level. Other major functions 
of the RBNZ include supporting a healthy financial system, monitoring and regulating the 
commercial banks, and supplying New Zealand currency to the public. Monetary policy is 
the key instrument by which the RBNZ maintains a stable price level. Currently, New 
Zealand’s monetary policy is aimed at maintaining an inflation rate in the consumer price 
index of 1% to 3%, on average, during the medium term. This is required by the Policy 
Targets Agreement (PTA) to define their standard of price stability, which has to be 
approved by both the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the RBNZ (Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand website, 2010). 
 
Since March 1999, the Official Cash Rate (OCR) has been the instrument by which 
RBNZ implements its monetary policy. In general, RBNZ reviews the OCR eight times 
each year, and makes adjustments respectively. To move against inflation, contractionary 
monetary policy can be applied by increasing the OCR which feeds through to higher 
retail interest rates, thus increasing saving and reducing spending. Consequently, demand 
will decrease and the inflationary pressure will be expected to drop. On the other hand, 
under expansionary monetary policy the RBNZ will reduce the OCR to increase spending 
and reduce saving, commonly used during recessionary periods with no inflationary 
pressure. The increase on demand will encourage economic activity, but may also 
generate inflationary pressure if the demand is pushed beyond the economy’s supply-side 
capacity.  
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It is generally accepted that a change in monetary policy also affects the exchange rate. A 
tight monetary policy is accompanied by a high base interest rate. A higher interest rate 
indicates a higher return on domestic assets than foreign assets, which attracts investors 
and increases the demand for domestic currency. As demand increases, the value of the 
domestic currency increases as well, hence, the exchange rate should increase in response 
to a tight monetary policy. Conversely, the exchange rate will reduce if an expansionary 
monetary policy is implemented.  
 
1.2.2 Global Financial Crisis 
The current global financial crisis started in 2007 due to the burst of the housing bubble in 
America; when many financial institutions were bankrupted or bailed out by their 
government. There is general agreement that deregulation in the United States lending 
system, supported by the US government, a policy of low interest rates, and speculation 
in the housing market were major contributors to this bubble. It has been described as the 
worst financial crisis since the 1930s’ Great Depression, and like the Great Depression, 
has a large impact on the global economy.  According to the RBNZ, the New Zealand 
economy has been affected by the crisis since June 2008, while diffidence about 
investment and declines in exports have also damaged the New Zealand economy.  
 
In order to maintain a stable economy, RBNZ lowered the OCR and has kept it at a low 
level. This can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the movements of the New Zealand 
OCR since the 17
th
 of March 1999. According to the Monetary Policy Statement of June 
2008, the economy at that time was weak but with high inflation in energy and food 
products. The international credit crisis would slow down New Zealand’s economic 
growth and weaker domestic economic activities could reduce New Zealand’s GDP in 
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2008,hence the RBNZ decided to reduce the OCR from 8.25 percent to 8.0 percent on the 
24
th
 of July 2008, which was the first OCR cut in five years.  In September 2008, the 
RBNZ reduced the OCR further down to 7.5 percent as, with the problems of higher cost 
and lower demand, the RBNZ was expecting weaker business activities in the future. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Official Cash Rate in New Zealand, 1999-2010 
 
By December 2008, the OCR had been reduced to 5.0 percent and by March 2009, to 3.0 
percent. Thus, from June 2008 to March 2009, New Zealand’s OCR had been reduced 
from a high of 8.25 percent down to only 3.0 percent. In other words, over a space of nine 
months, RBNZ had reduced the OCR by 525 basis points in total. This dramatic reduction 
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clearly indicated that the RBNZ was implementing an expansionary monetary policy in 
order to avoid significant economic harm from the impacts of the global financial crisis.  
 
The damaged international financial markets reduced total demand and economic 
activities all around the world, and any decrease in world demand has the potential to 
harm New Zealand’s export sector. A reduction in export revenue directly slowed New 
Zealand’s GDP and domestic economy, so, in order to boost the economy, the RBNZ 
directly employed expansionary monetary policy to depreciate the New Zealand currency. 
This expansionary policy should have reduced the exchange rate and boosted the 
domestic economy. However, the result has not been achieved, partly due to the sheer 
scale of the financial tsunami. This particular background has added to the significance of 
the thesis in that one can examine the effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange 
rate with and without the presence of the global financial crisis.  
 
1.3 Current Issues and Research Questions 
Obben et al. (2006) pointed out that the New Zealand export sectors have been hurt by the 
high exchange rate. In addition, Cline and Williamson (2010) also noted that the New 
Zealand exchange rate is very high and the New Zealand dollar is overvalued. Based on 
these findings, some New Zealand exporters are complaining that the monetary policy, 
despite the sharp fall in the OCR, is still keeping the exchange rate too high and the 
RBNZ should lower it quickly. Others are arguing that the RBNZ should not shoulder all 
the responsibility, since other economic and financial factors may also be at play. This 
debate provides the main context for this thesis, which focuses on the immediate effects 
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of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in New Zealand. In order to address this 
problem, there are three research questions to be answered.  
 
1. Does the exchange rate puzzle exist in the New Zealand market? 
According to Zettelmeyer (2004), Kearns and Manners (2006), and Karim et al. (2007), 
there is no evidence of an exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand. In general, a contraction 
in monetary policy will raise the value of New Zealand’s currency, while, conversely, an 
expansion of monetary policy will depreciate the value of the New Zealand dollar. Based 
on this, standard theory, RBNZ should be able to reduce the exchange rate by 
implementing expansionary monetary policy. However, Wilkinson et al. (2001) noted that 
the fluctuation of New Zealand’s exchange rate does not consistently follow the theory, 
and their results suggested that a tightening of monetary policy could reduce the value of 
New Zealand currency. This conclusion contradicts those of the other authors mentioned 
above, indicating that the exchange rate puzzle does exist in New Zealand. 
 
Given this conflict, changing monetary policy in one direction could have two opposite 
impacts on exchange rate movements, based on previous evidence in New Zealand. A 
positive monetary policy shock could lead the exchange rate to increase, which shows no 
evidence of an exchange rate puzzle, or it could cause the New Zealand dollar to 
depreciate, which lends support to the exchange rate puzzle theory.  Knowledge of 
whether the exchange rate puzzle exists in New Zealand is therefore essential to the study 
of the effect of monetary policy shocks on the New Zealand exchange rates; hence, the 
first objective is to find out whether an exchange rate puzzle exists in New Zealand.  
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2. How much could RBNZ immediately influence the exchange rate through monetary 
policy? 
In order to examine the effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate, it is also 
important to find out how much and how quickly the RBNZ could influence the exchange 
rate through changes in its monetary policy instrument. In New Zealand, the RBNZ has 
the independent authority to regulate monetary policy through OCR announcements, and 
has a responsibility to maintain a stable inflation rate, within a certain range, when 
applying the policy. It is also important for RBNZ to monitor and maintain a sound and 
efficient financial system in New Zealand. International trade is crucial to New Zealand’s 
economic development and financial system, and, since there is a close relationship 
between international trade and the exchange rate, fluctuations in the exchange rate have 
a significant influence on New Zealand’s economy. Therefore, the second objective is to 
find out how much the RBNZ could immediately influence the exchange rate through 
monetary policy. The result could disclose the capability and authority of the RBNZ to 
influence the value of New Zealand currency through monetary policy shocks (although it 
should be recognised that its statutory objective is to maintain general price stability, not 
maintain a target exchange rate).    
 
3. Have the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate been influenced by the 
current financial tsunami? 
After the global financial tsunami hit the New Zealand market, on the 24
th
 of July 2008, 
the OCR was lowered for the first time in five years. Although the RBNZ has 
implemented expansionary monetary policy to fight against the recession, New Zealand 
producers have been significantly hurt. The current global financial crisis had a large 
impact on New Zealand’s economic activities and forced the RBNZ to reduce the OCR 
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by 525 basis points in nine months. All of the evidence indicates that monetary policy 
from the middle of 2008 has been influenced by the financial crisis. Since its influence 
has been visible in New Zealand markets, it is important to analyse the impact of the 
current global financial crisis. The results could help monetary authorities to perform 
better when facing the next financial shock and could provide investors with better 
information for the future. Therefore, the third research objective is to find out whether 
the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate have been influenced by the 
global financial crisis. 
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 will present the literature review on the relationship between monetary policy 
shocks and exchange rate movements. How to identify monetary policy shocks will be 
explained and evidence of exchange rate puzzles will also be discussed, including the two 
main methods of this research. In addition, some arguments about applying these two 
methods will be reviewed.   
 
Chapter 3 will present the methodology that is used in this thesis. The regression models, 
the selected variables, and the data will be explained.  
 
Chapter 4 will analyse the modelling results based on the chosen methodology. The 
results will then be compared with previous studies and used to answer the three research 
questions.  
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Chapter 5 will summarize the findings produced through this research and discuss their 
implications for the research problem addressed in this thesis. The importance and 
limitations of this thesis will also be given. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
Based on the standard theory, a contractionary monetary policy reduces money supply 
which increases the domestic exchange rate. However, some evidence has shown the 
opposite impact on the exchange rate.  This special case is called the exchange rate puzzle. 
There have been a large number of papers studying the relationship between monetary 
policy and the exchange rate. To summarize how the monetary policy shock is identified, 
there are two main lines of research. First, the Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach, 
which includes the Structure Vector Autoregression model (SVAR) and the Vector Error 
Correlation Model (VECM) under specified restrictions, commonly used to examine the 
long run dynamic effect between monetary policy and the exchange rate. Secondly, event-
study approaches, which are normally carried out with a single equation model, usually 
estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, and typically used to examine 
the short run effect or same day effect of monetary policy changes and movements in the 
exchange rate.  
 
2.2 Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks 
Before studying the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates, it is important to 
identify monetary policy shocks first. A monetary policy shock is an unexpected (as 
perceived by the market) change in monetary conditions introduced by the monetary 
authorities. In general terms, monetary policy can be implemented by changes in three 
monetary policy instruments: the Base Money (M1), the Base Interest Rate, and the level 
14 
 
of Non-Borrowed Reserves. The base money contains coins, paper money, and any assets 
that can quickly be converted into currency, which represents the amount of liquid money 
supply in the economy. The base interest rate is the target price of borrowing money from 
the central bank, such as the OCR in New Zealand and the Federal Funds Rate in 
America. Non-borrowed reserves act like base money and indicate the surplus of reserves 
in the banking system, which influences the amount that bank has available to lend to 
clients. A central bank can use one or more of these three instruments to control the 
amount of money supply in order to stabilize the country’s economy. For example, if the 
country is experiencing high inflation in the market, the central bank can implement a 
contractionary monetary policy to reduce inflation by reducing the base money, 
increasing the base interest rate, or reducing non-borrowed reserves.  
 
There are many studies in the literature relating to different measures of monetary policy 
shocks. Cushman and Zha (1997) and Wilkinson et al, (2001) employed changes in base 
money (M1) to measure monetary policy shocks. Changes in non-borrowed reserves as 
another monetary policy shock indicator have been used by Koray and McMillin (1999), 
Kim (2001), and Faust and Rogers (2003). The most popular indicator of monetary policy 
shocks, however, is changes in the relative short term interest rate which are very strongly 
influenced by the central bank’s base interest rate (the OCR in New Zealand).  
 
According to Bernanke and Blinder (1992), for example, changes in short term interest 
rates are dominated by monetary policy shocks, but are not as sensitive to other 
influences. Therefore, the relative short term interest rate is more reliable in indicating 
monetary policy shocks compared with other indicators. In addition, the market interest 
rate is the Reserve Bank’s interest rate plus a measurement value (risk premium) from the 
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market. According to Piazzesi and Swanson (2004), the risk premium remains stable 
during short term periods. Thus, differences in the short term interest rate are a reasonable 
proxy for monetary policy shocks due to changes in the OCR after the risk premium is 
cancelled during the process. In this research, monetary policy shocks will be identified 
by the immediate reaction of either the 30-day interest rate or the 90-day interest rate to 
OCR announcements in New Zealand. 
 
With the understanding that the OCR is the indicator of New Zealand monetary policy, it 
is important to find out how to identify monetary policy shocks in different models. There 
are three types of model commonly used to study the relationship between monetary 
policy shocks and the exchange rate. In the VAR model, the monetary policy shock is 
identified by the disturbance term to the short term interest rate ( Ɛ 
   ). Under the SVAR 
model, the monetary policy shock is identified by the structural disturbance to the short 
term interest rate (𝐵 Ɛ 
  ) whereby the identification of the 𝐵  is conducted with a method 
such as the Choleski decomposition method. Under the Event Study model, the monetary 
policy shock is identified by the difference in the short term interest rate within an event 
window ( ∆𝐼𝑅  ). 
 
In New Zealand, the RBNZ has independent authority to adjust the OCR in order to keep 
inflation within the target range. The dates for possible changes are announced in advance 
(typically every eight weeks), so that financial markets can anticipate the direction and 
level of any change with whatever public knowledge is available at the time, including 
the possibility of an announcement that of no change. Even if the public makes the right 
prediction on the direction of monetary policy movement, they may not be able to 
estimate the exact amount of changes on the OCR; therefore, each OCR announcement is 
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unpredictable. The unexpected changes in the Official Cash Rate represent monetary 
policy shocks in New Zealand, which will be reflected in changes to retail interest rates 
after each announcement. 
 
2.3 Earlier Evidence on Exchange Rate Puzzle 
This section presents some earlier evidence of the exchange rate puzzle. Dornbusch 
(1976) was the first to explain volatile exchange rates through the overshooting model, 
which argued that a change in the exchange rate has a faster effect on the asset markets 
than on the goods markets. In the short run, therefore, the exchange rate will depreciate 
after a positive monetary policy shock in the asset market, but by more than it should 
since the goods’ prices are relatively sticky in the goods markets.  During the adjustment 
of exchange rate fluctuation, in the long run, the exchange rate moves back to its 
equilibrium at a higher value than in the short run, thus the exchange rate is highly 
fluctuating over time, and the changes could be volatile.  
 
In another early study, Urich and Wachtel (1981) examined how money supply 
announcements could affect the interest rate. Their result indicates that if there is an 
unexpected money supply increase the interest rate is likely to rise, due to speculators’ 
intervention in the market. Following this research, Cornell (1982) examined the 
relationship between money supply announcements, the interest rate and the exchange 
rate by testing joint hypotheses. The result indicated that an unanticipated increase in the 
money supply could raise the interest rate and exchange rate if the investors believe that 
the current monetary expansion would soon lead to a monetary contraction in order to 
balance the current oversupply of money. Speculators increase the demand for the 
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currency and expect to make a profit when the tightening monetary policy is 
implemented. This speculation pushes the interest rate to rise, but in response to the 
anticipated monetary contraction in the future rather than to the current monetary 
expansion. The increase in demand for the currency also raises the exchange rate, for the 
same reason.  
 
Batten and Thornton (1984) noted that there are two possible and opposite effects on the 
exchange rate movement following a monetary policy shock. If there is a negative shock 
on money supply, the public may believe that the central bank is trying to tighten 
monetary conditions to lower inflation. In this case, the exchange rate will increase 
following a negative monetary policy shock, consistent with the standard theory. On the 
other hand, the negative monetary shock could lead the exchange rate to decrease if the 
public believes that the unanticipated contraction will lead to expansion in money supply 
in the future. With this expectation of future expansion, investors lose confidence on the 
currency and the exchange rate will decrease. This result indicates an exchange rate 
puzzle.  
 
2.4 Vector Auto-regressive Model (VAR) 
VAR is capable of capturing the evolution of and the interdependencies between multiple 
time series. Model (1) represents a basic VAR regression with one dependent variable. 
Model (2) represents a VAR regression with two dependent variables. 
 
                                     (1) 
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{
                                      
                                      
    (2) 
 
The equations in the VAR model explain each variable’s evolution based on its own lags 
and the lags of all the other variables in the model. The right hand side of the equation 
only contains the past value of the variables. If      symbolizes the indicator of monetary 
policy, then      will indicate the monetary policy shocks.  
 
Since Sims (1980) introduced the VAR model, the methodology has been extensively 
used for dynamic macroeconomics analyses. Although VAR has gained credibility in 
examining changes in multivariate time series, there are many arguments against using a 
VAR to study the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. According to 
Fung and Kasumovich (1998), one of the problems regards the recursive-causal structure, 
which could cause puzzles when using the VAR method to analyse the effects of 
monetary shocks.  Lately, Bjornland (2008) noted that simultaneity is another issue when 
estimating the relationship between monetary policy and exchange rate using a VAR 
model.  In order to solve this problem, the restricted recursive VAR model was 
commonly used to remove the simultaneous effects in previous research, although the 
consequence could cause biased estimation.  
 
2.4.1 VAR in Research on Exchange Rate Puzzle 
Sims (1992) used a VAR model to study the relationship between monetary policy shocks 
and exchange rate variations, using monthly data from the 1950s to the 1990s, with 
variables including interest rate, base money, consumer price index, production, and 
exchange rate. The result showed a significant and continual negative relationship 
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between interest rates and exchange rates in France and Germany, where contractionary 
monetary policy shocks reduced the value of domestic currency in both countries. 
Evidence of an exchange rate puzzle was clearly identified in this study, and Sims noted 
that this exchange rate puzzle could be caused by inflationary pressure.  
 
However, a later study by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) did not find any exchange rate 
puzzle in the USA. Their research investigated the impact of Federal Reserve monetary 
policy shocks on the exchange rate from January 1974 to May 1990, measured by 
innovations in the Federal Funds rate, non-borrowed reserves, and the Romer and Romer 
index of monetary policy in different VAR models. The results indicated that tightening 
monetary policy caused the US interest rate to rise first, followed by US Dollar 
appreciation. In addition, the results also reported that monetary policy shocks did not 
have a major impact on the exchange rate in the USA.  
 
In the same year, Grilli and Roubini (1995) also applied the VAR approach to study the 
effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates in the G-7 countries. Like 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), they also found no evidence of an exchange rate puzzle in 
the USA; however, the results indicated that all other G-7 countries experienced negative 
impacts on their currency values after contractionary monetary policy shocks. One of the 
reasons given was unexpected shocks on inflation. This exchange rate puzzle is consistent 
with the one in Sims (1992), with inflationary pressure emerging as the key to explaining 
the exchange rate puzzle in the VAR approach.  
 
Another problem that often appears when using the VAR analyses is the liquidity puzzle. 
According to Leeper and Gordon (1992), the liquidity puzzle could arise when the 
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monetary policy shock is caused, in the short run, by changes in the monetary aggregates, 
such as the base money (M1). Sims (1992) also indicated that, when facing unexpected 
changes in money demand, the monetary policy shocks cannot be well explained by the 
changes in monetary aggregates.  
 
Fung and Kasumovich (1998) also noted that using the VAR method to analyse the 
relationship between monetary shocks and exchange rate could frequently cause two 
puzzles. One is the liquidity puzzle, where the interest rate decreases immediately 
following a monetary contraction. The other one is the price puzzle, where, when facing a 
negative monetary shock, the price level increases instantly instead of decreasing. Using 
the appropriate monetary policy instrument (such as short term interest rate) that is only 
directly effected by the central bank could avoid the first puzzle. However, the solution 
for the first puzzle could lead to the second puzzle, which is the price puzzle and often 
occurs while facing pressures from inflation.  
 
Facing the above problems, some researchers have found that applying an appropriate 
identification scheme in the VAR model is the key to solving the various puzzles. 
Therefore, structural VAR with non-recursive simultaneous restrictions has become the 
standard method for analyzing the effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rates.  
 
2.4.2 SVAR in Research on the Exchange Rate Puzzle 
Cushman and Zha (1997) argued that inadequate monetary shock identification schemes 
are the basic problem causing puzzles in previous research on the effects of monetary 
policy shocks. Therefore, they examined the impacts of monetary policy shocks on the 
exchange rate in Canada using a Structural Vector Auto-regressive (SVAR) method. This 
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research also noted that shocks in foreign economies have immediate effects on a small 
open economy; therefore   it is necessary to eliminate the exogeneity to provide more 
reliable results. Both Canadian base money and the 90-day Treasury bill rate were used to 
identify monetary policy shocks. The findings were that a contractionary monetary policy 
shock (such as reducing the money base or increasing the interest rate) raises the 
exchange rate and increases the value of Canadian dollar. That result therefore did not 
show any evidence of an exchange rate puzzle.  
 
Kim and Roubini (2000) introduced a structural VAR approach to studying the 
relationship between monetary policy shocks and exchange rate’s movement. They 
applied non-recursive simultaneous restrictions to identify monetary policy shocks and 
with an identification scheme that allowed the monetary policy shocks and exchange rate 
shocks to react simultaneously, both the liquidity puzzle and the price puzzle were solved. 
Their result showed that there was no evidence of an exchange rate puzzle in the non-US 
G-7 countries over the sampled time period.  
 
It has also been noted that a floating exchange rate can have significant effects on the 
domestic price level (inflation rate) (Bjornland, 2008). Furthermore, inflation has effects 
on monetary policy and monetary policy has effects on the floating exchange rate. Thus, 
in a small open economy, the exchange rate and monetary policy have a close interactive 
relationship, especially if monetary policy is targeting the domestic inflation rate. It is 
therefore not appropriate to apply contemporaneous restrictions in VAR for a small open 
economy with an inflation target. Hence, a structural VAR model was used in the 
research, allowing simultaneous interactions between monetary policy and other variables, 
but restricting the long-run effects on the real exchange rate. Quarterly data between the 
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first quarter of 1993 and the third quarter of 2004 were used in the updated SVAR model 
to measure the impacts of monetary policy on the exchange rate in Norway and no 
evidence of an exchange rate puzzle was found. 
 
In order to support the VAR result, Bjornland (2008) also used OLS in an event study 
approach to examine the immediate effect of monetary policy announcements on the 
exchange rate. Both approaches indicated the same result: that loosening monetary policy 
causes the exchange rate to depreciate.  Moreover, a one percentage point rise in the 90-
day interest rate was estimated to increase the value of Norwegian Krone by 
approximately two percent confirming the event study approach as another important 
method to analyse the effect of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates.  
 
2.5 Event Study 
Event studies typically use ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the impact of 
monetary shocks on the exchange rate. The general form of the regression is shown in 
equation 3. 
 
                  (3) 
 
For a single equation event study on the monetary-exchange rate nexus, OLS can be used 
to estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks on the country’s exchange rate, namely, 
the  . On the left hand side of model (3), differences in the exchange rate is the 
dependent variable, on the right hand side is the independent variable which indicates the 
monetary policy shocks, such as differences in the short term interest rate. An event 
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window is applied to each variable in order to measure the changes before and after the 
monetary policy announcement, with the coefficient of the independent variable 
indicating the relationship between monetary policy shocks and exchange rate movements. 
 
Hardouvelis (1988) used such an event study to analyse the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the exchange rate in America. The sample period was October 1979 to August 
1984 and the result was consistent with standard economic theory. Increases in the 
interest rate led the American currency to appreciate, thus, no exchange rate puzzle was 
found in this research. 
 
Similarly, Lewis (1995) examined the effect of monetary policy shocks on America’s 
foreign exchange rates. Base money, non-borrowed reserves, and the Federal Funds rate 
were used as indicators over a sample period from 1985 to 1990. Again, no exchange rate 
puzzle was found, supporting the standard theory that contractionary monetary policy 
lead to an appreciation of the US dollar.  
 
More recently, Bonser-Neal et al. (1998) used the event study approach to examine the 
relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate in America. The time periods 
were from September 1974 to September 1979 and from October 1987 to December 1994 
when the Federal Reserve was using the Federal Funds rate as its monetary policy 
instrument. The results showed that for both the spot and forward exchange rates, a 
tightening of monetary policy led to the US dollar appreciating in all periods. 
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2.6 Exchange Rate Puzzle in New Zealand  
Regarding the New Zealand market, Wilkinson et al. (2001) argued that there was 
evidence of the exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand, studying monthly data from March 
1985 to March 1998 for both New Zealand and Australia. Short-term interest rates, 
foreign-domestic interest rate differentials, and base money were separately used to 
indicate monetary policy shocks in three different VAR models for comparison. The 
results showed some evidence against the standard theory, as an increase in the New 
Zealand base money would lead to an initial appreciation of the NZ Dollar against the 
Japanese Yen, British Pound, and US Dollar in all three models. In addition, an increase 
in the short-term interest rate depreciated the NZ Dollar against the Australian Dollar by a 
small amount, but appreciated the NZ Dollar against all of the other three currencies 
studied. However, there is no exchange rate puzzle when the monetary policy shocks 
were measured by the interest rate differentials for all four currencies. Overall, the 
research concluded that the New Zealand exchange rate was mainly explained by its past 
values, and although monetary policy shocks did have impacts on the exchange rates, 
their contributions were weaker than the effects from CPI and production. The results also 
reported little evidence of the overshooting hypothesis in New Zealand. For Australia, the 
results were more consistent with the standard theory and previous studies.  
 
When Zettelmeyer (2004) used OLS to estimate the monetary policy shock’s effects on 
exchange rates in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, an instrumental variable was 
introduced to solve the endogeneity problem between the exchange rate and the interest 
rate. In addition, each news broadcast on the announcement day was classified from 1 to 
3:  Class “1” indicated no significant influence on the announcement; Class “2” 
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represented that the news could have some influence on the monetary policy, however, 
such evidence is not traceable to any document; Class “3” meant the impact of the public 
news was significant and the relative data needed to be removed. By eliminating the 
endogeneity, the results proved consistent with the standard economic theory. As 
monetary policy was identified by changes in the 90-day interest rate, the results further 
indicated that the exchange rate increased by two to three percent when the 90-day 
interest rate rose by one percentage point.  
 
Kearns and Manners (2006) also examined the impact of monetary policy on the 
exchange rate using the event study approach with intraday data in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and United Kingdom. Since the monetary policy change had been 
determined before the announcement was made to the public, the influence from other 
news on the announcement day could be ignored. In addition, the effect of the endogenity 
problem on the interest rate and exchange rate was minimised by using intraday data. In 
order to reduce the public news effects on the exchange rate, they applied a 70-minute 
event window to the dependent variable. The results indicated a positive relationship 
between interest rates and exchange rates in all four countries, where tightening monetary 
policy leads the exchange rate to appreciate, consistent with the standard theory. 
Moreover, an unexpected rise in the interest rate by 100-basis-points led the exchange 
rate to increase by approximately 1.5 per cent.   
 
In another study, Karim et al. (2007) examined the effects of monetary policy shocks on 
the exchange rate with a SVAR model by addressing different variable groups from four 
research areas: international economy, terms of trade, domestic economy and climate. 
The result did not show any evidence of an exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand, and, in 
26 
 
addition, showed that monetary policy shocks have a smaller effect on the exchange rate 
compared with changes in other economic activities. In fact, the New Zealand monetary 
policy shock only indicated a one percent variation in the NZD/UDS exchange rate, and 
less than one percent variation in the NZD/GBP rate.  
 
2.7 Comparison of VAR and Event Study Approaches 
Even though the VAR model is commonly used to examine the relationship between 
monetary policy and the exchange rate, there are many researchers who have expressed 
dissatisfaction with this model. Engel and Frankel (1984), Hardouvelis (1984), Hakkio 
and Pearce (1985), and Ito and Roley (1987) noted that, in comparison with the VAR 
approach, an event study has better outcomes in isolating the economic news’ effects 
from the effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate. 
 
Furthermore, according to Rudebusch (1998), VAR models do not make sense for 
measuring monetary policy shocks in the context of the USA for two reasons, closely 
related to two important characteristics of the VAR model. The first is related to the 
monetary policy equation or monetary reaction equation in the VAR system, which 
models the endogenous part of the monetary policy, and which Rudebusch found unable 
to estimate the reaction of Federal Reserve correctly, due to four major shortcomings 
inherent in the standard VAR approach.  
 
First, while economic structure and monetary policy reactions have been changing over 
time, the VAR kept using a simple constant linear structure for estimating the monetary 
policy reactions and shocks. As the Federal Reserve has to react differently in a changing 
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environment, time-invariant linear monetary VARs could be prone to misspecifications.  
In fact, a Chow test and Andrews’ (1993) maximum F test pointed to structural changes 
which refuted the time-invariant structure assumed by the VAR model. To provide 
economic evidence for the instability of the structure governing the reaction process, 
Rudebusch contrasted the VAR reaction function with the Taylor rule, which is widely 
acknowledged to be a good approximation of how the Federal Reserve set policy under 
Chairman Alan Greenspan and, hence, is used as the benchmark.  The results showed a 
stark difference in terms of to what and how the Federal Reserve would react.  This point 
is reinforced by the large differences between the two kinds of reaction functions, in 
terms of how the Federal Reserve responded to exogenous shocks to the other variables as 
well as its own policy.   
 
Secondly, the information set, or the right-hand-side variables, in the monetary VAR 
were not broad enough. Christiano (1996) claimed that commodity prices, as an important 
factor in monetary policy, will only be meaningful if the VAR is accurately identified.  
However, inclusion of extra variables in the VAR would worsen the possible 
multicollinearity problem, evidenced by the statistical insignificance of most regressors.   
 
Thirdly, the monetary VARs used final and revised data to model policy reactions while, 
in the real world, policy makers had to react to initial releases of data.  For example, the 
final data of one variable ending in March may not be available for release before May. 
By using the revised data, the error term of the VAR regression could be correlated with 
one of the variables, thus, the relative coefficient that is used to explain the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables could be biased.  
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Fourthly, and finally, the VARs had a long distributed lag structure in which about half of 
the variables that were lagged 4 or more periods were significant.  This suggested that the 
authority reacted systematically to old information, that is, for example, the authority 
reacted to 4-month old information whenever it reacted.  Given that a large literature base 
points to the fact that there is no information in the term structure for predicting interest 
rates, it is unlikely that the Federal Reserve would react to old information systematically, 
hence, the significance of the coefficients is most certainly spurious, resulting from in-
sample data fitting. 
 
Rudebusch’s second   criticism is related to the measurement of the monetary policy 
shock, which is considered the exogenous part of the monetary policy.  Since a monetary 
policy shock was measured as the regression residual in the VAR, the measurement 
would be incorrect if the reaction function was estimated incorrectly, which appeared to 
be the case from the above discussions.  He suggested a better source for constructing 
monetary policy shocks was needed, for example, utilising rates from the federal funds 
futures contracts.  This avoided the problem of interest rate residuals from the VAR being 
uncorrelated with financial market shocks as, in financial markets, shocks in futures 
markets may differ from the VAR interest rate residuals.  This conjecture was supported 
by the lack of fit of the shocks estimated from the VAR to the ones based on the federal 
funds futures contracts.  What is more disappointing is that even the VARs that 
Rudebusch examined could not agree with each other on the size of the monetary policy 
shocks.   
 
Later, Brunner (2000) also critiqued the reliability of VAR approaches in determining 
monetary policy shocks. In a VAR estimation, all economic data from the previous 
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periods are assumed to be available for all researchers at the beginning of the examining 
period; however, this is hardly possible in reality. In fact, many of the economic data in 
period t-1 may not even be accessible to the public in period t+1. This is particularly 
obvious when analysing monetary policy shocks.  
 
On the other hand, an event study approach is much easier to handle and the result is 
more reliable overall than the VAR method as its approach eliminates the problems of 
exogeneity. In addition, the impacts of monetary policy shocks are difficult to e measure 
completely and accurately by VAR, especially in a small open economy, whereas the 
event study offers a natural definition of a policy shock. Since this thesis measures 
monetary policy shocks as the immediate changes in market interest rate, the event study 
approach is preferred to the VAR approach and is therefore adopted. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
If changes in monetary policy could be anticipated accurately by all the public, then there 
would be no monetary policy shocks to the market and no consequent changes in the 
exchange rate. However, due to limited information and resources available to the public, 
the decision on whether to change the Official Cash Rate (and by how much) cannot be 
estimated precisely. Each OCR announcement is therefore a potential monetary policy 
shock that is not fully anticipated, consequently, the exchange rate can change after each 
OCR announcement removes the uncertainty leading up to the announcement. This 
feature is what allows an event study to explore the relationship between monetary policy 
shocks and their impact on exchange rate movements.   
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Although there have been many studies regarding the impact of monetary policy shocks 
on the exchange rate, there is very limited research focusing on the New Zealand market, 
especially after the RBNZ employed the OCR as its instrument of monetary policy from 
1999 and more especially after the recent global financial crisis. Previous studies have 
produced mixed evidence for the existence of the exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand. 
Monetary policy has targeted price stability since a floating exchange rate was adopted in 
March 1985 and, as a small open economy, New Zealand’s exchange rate is relatively 
volatile. It is therefore important to find out whether the RBNZ’s monetary policy does 
have the standard impact on the exchange rate and to measure the size of that impact if it 
does (including after the global financial crisis). These questions are addressed in the 
remainder of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology, Variables, and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
The research for this study applied the event study method, estimated by an OLS 
regression, using New Zealand data. The daily nominal exchange rate was used to 
calculate the dependent variable. Both the 30-day and 90-day interest rates were 
separately used as the independent variable. A dummy variable was used to distinguish 
the impact of the global financial crisis on the effect of monetary policy shocks on New 
Zealand’s exchange rate during the sample period between 17th of March 1999 and the 
10
th
 of June 2010. In total, there were 90 observations available, including the only 
unscheduled OCR announcement during the period (which was shortly after the 
September 11
th
 terrorism attack in the United States).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
This research focuses on how the RBNZ influences the exchange rate through monetary 
policy shocks during the period, since March 1999, when the RBNZ has been utilising the 
OCR as its monetary policy instrument. The RBNZ reviews the OCR eight times a year 
on scheduled dates, and, since each OCR is scheduled and announced to the public on a 
specific day, changes in retail interest rates and in the country’s exchange rate on that day 
are key events suitable for this study. Since the OCR is not updated every day, any data 
regarding short term interest rate movements between two OCR announcements should 
contain influences from the public. Therefore, the VAR method is not appropriate for this 
study.  
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The sample period is from the 27th of March 1999 to 10th of June 2010, with 92 
observations available in total providing adequate observations for the event study 
approach. With a prescheduled OCR announcement date, what happens on the 
announcement day does not feed back to the OCR decision-making process and hence the 
endogeneity problem is solved and, with a 24-hour event window, the impacts from other 
public news should be eliminated. The empirical analyses are conducted using the event 
study models due to Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006) that can be 
estimated by OLS, however, the methods used by these previous authors need closer 
examination. 
 
Zettelmeyer (2004) applied his event study method to the relationship between monetary 
policy shocks and the exchange rate from 1990 to 2000 in New Zealand. During that 
period the RBNZ mainly focused on the “cash target” as its monetary policy instrument 
prior to 1999. With a daily target “open mouth” operation system, news regarding the 
interest rate and exchange rate could influence the daily warnings from RBNZ. In order to 
get an unbiased estimation of the impact, Zettelmeyer argued that any other news which 
affected the relative interest rates and exchange rate on the announcement day had to be 
eliminated. As mentioned earlier, each news item on the announcement day was classified 
from 1 to 3. If the announcement day contained class “3” news, then this observation was 
removed from the sample.  
 
He also noted the endogeneity problem between interest rate and exchange rate. Under 
the daily target “open mouth” operation system, the changes in the interest rate could 
influence the movements of the exchange rate, while the interest rate could also be 
influenced by the changes on the exchange rate. This interrelationship violated the OLS 
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assumption that the dependent variable cannot correlate with the independent variable.  In 
order to solve this problem, a two-stage least squares approach was introduced by 
Zettelmeyer, with the idea of eliminating the interrelationship between the interest rate 
and exchange rate. An instrumental variable was introduced to generate the uncorrelated 
interest rate in the first stage, which only responded to the changes in monetary policy, 
but not to changes in the exchange rate.  The second stage was to analyse the effect of 
monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate, using the percentage change in the nominal 
exchange rate as the dependent variable on the left hand side of the regression and the 
percentage change on the generated interest rate as the independent variable on the right 
hand side of the regression. Changes in the generated interest rate indicated monetary 
policy shocks, and its coefficient measures the marginal impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the exchange rate. According to Zettelmeyer (2004), there was no exchange 
rate puzzle in New Zealand and a 100-basis-point surprise tightening of monetary policy 
could raise the exchange rate by 2.72%. 
 
Kearns and Manners (2006) also employed an event study method to analyse the impact 
of monetary policy shocks on exchange rate in New Zealand over the period from March 
1999 to June 2004, with 42 observations in total. During this period, each Official Cash 
Rate was decided before the announcement day via a Board meeting of the RBNZ, 
therefore any change in the exchange rate on the announcement day could not influence 
the decision on the predetermined OCR. Although the market interest rate may be 
influenced by other events, the impact is minimal since the monetary policy 
announcement is the most important shock to the interest rate on the OCR announcement 
day. With a short event window, the correlation problem between interest rate and 
exchange rate was eliminated; consequently, any public news on the OCR announcement 
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day could not affect the already determined OCR. Since interest rate data were available 
only on a daily basis, they utilised a 24-hour event window for the short term interest 
rates and applied a seventy-minute event window to the exchange rate to minimise 
influence from other factors.  
 
3.2.1 Comparison of the Methodologies 
Based on the two studies just described, this paper examines the immediate effects of 
monetary policy announcements on New Zealand’s exchange rate during the period 
between March 1999 and June 2010. In New Zealand, decisions on monetary policy are 
determined by a Board meeting before the announcement day; therefore, other news on 
announcement day does not influence the decision as it was made before the news 
occurred. In addition, movements in the exchange rate upon the announcement will not 
influence the OCR for the same reason. Consequently, neither the news classification nor 
the instrument variable components of the study by Zettelmeyer (2004) are required for 
this research. This is consistent with the study by Kearns and Manners (2006). 
 
Moreover, according to Kearns and Manners (2006), shorter intraday data could more 
precisely control for endogentity and external factors that might influence both the 
exchange rate and the interest rate and therefore applied a seventy-minute event window 
to the changes in exchange rate. They still used the 24-hour event window for changes in 
the short term interest rate however, since they did not have access to data for a seventy-
minute event window for this rate. In this case, the monetary policy shock was measured 
within a 24-hour time period but the effect on exchange rate was measured within a 
seventy-minute time period. This “two time period” approach was not consistent and may 
cause bias in the results. For that reason, this study differs from Kearns and Manners 
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(2006), and applies a 24-hour event window for both changes on nominal exchange rate 
and short term interest rate, consistent with the study by Zettelmeyer (2004). In addition, 
this study covers the period from the 17
th
 of March 1999 to the 10
th
 of June 2010 with 90 
observations available, more than double the observations available to Kearns and 
Manners (2006). Consequently, the result should be more reliable and accurate. Last but 
not least, in order to find out the impact of the global financial crisis, this study introduces 
a dummy variable to distinguish the effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange 
rate after the onset of the crisis. Table 1 summarises comparisons of the three studies.  
 
3.2.2 The Exchange Rate Model 
Adopting the event study method, the impact of monetary policy shocks on the exchange 
rate can be specified by the following regression: 
 
∆        ∆    Ɛ                           (4) 
 
Note: 
∆   is the percentage change in the nominal exchange rates before and after 
the OCR announcement, with the time interval between t and t-1 equal to 
24 hours. 
   is the coefficient of the changes in short term interest rate. 
∆    is the change of percentage points in the short term interest rates before 
and after the OCR announcement, with the time interval between t and t-1 
equal to 24 hours. 
Ɛ   is the error term. 
 
36 
 
Table 1: Comparison of the Three Methodologies 
 Zettelmeyer (2004) Kearns and 
Manners (2006) 
This Research 
Method Two-stage least 
squares 
Ordinary least 
squares 
Ordinary least 
squares 
Event 
window 
24 hour event 
window on both 
interest rate and 
exchange rate 
70 minute event 
window on exchange 
rate, but 24 hour 
event window on 
interest rate.   
24 hour event 
window on both 
interest rate and 
exchange rate 
Instrument 
Variable 
Direction (-1, 0, 1) is 
used to indicate the 
future condition of 
monetary policy. 
N/A N/A 
Dummy 
variable 
N/A N/A Used to distinguish 
between pre- and 
post- global 
financial crisis. 
Data series 90-day interest rate 
Directions on 
monetary policy 
News classification 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
30-day interest rate 
90-day interest rate 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
30-day interest rate 
90-day interest rate 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
Dummy variable 
Sample 
period 
08/01/90 ~ 01/19/00 17/03/99 ~ 10/06/04 21/04/99 ~ 10/06/10 
Observations 35 42 90 
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3.3 Selected Variables 
Many studies that focus on long run dynamic analysis have used either the real exchange 
rate or the nominal exchange rate separately as the dependent variable in their model. 
This study focuses on the immediate effects of monetary policy announcements on the 
exchange rate, which are measured within a 24-hour period. During this short event 
window, the price level does not change significantly and so the differences between the 
real exchange rate and nominal exchange rate are negligible. Therefore, only the nominal 
exchange rate is adopted in this event study approach, consistent with both Zettelmeyer 
(2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006). The impact on exchange rate can be observed 
through the difference in the nominal exchange rates within a 24-hour period before and 
after the OCR announcement. 
  
After identifying how to measure the impacts of changes on the exchange rate, it is also 
important to determine the variable that can be used to represent the monetary policy 
shock that occurs at each of the monetary policy announcements. In general, there are 
three important monetary instruments which are interest rate, base money, and the non-
borrowed reserves. New Zealand has adopted the OCR to indicate monetary policy 
changes since 1999. OCR is the interest rate set by the reserve bank to influence the cost 
of borrowing money for the retail banks in New Zealand; therefore the market retail 
interest rate has a close relationship with the OCR. As the OCR increases, retail interest 
rates should increase as well.  
 
If there is no change in the short-term retail interest rate after an OCR announcement, this 
means the level of the OCR after the announcement was fully anticipated by the markets 
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and, in this rare case, there is no policy shock. Typically, however, there is some 
uncertainty about the size of change to the OCR (even when the direction of change 
seems certain), and so the retail interest rate changes once that uncertainty is resolved by 
the policy announcement. Consequently, change in the short term retail interest rate is the 
best indicator of a policy shock during the event (announcement day). 
 
Consistent with this approach, Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) noted that the market interest 
rate is the base interest rate plus a risk premium and that the risk premium remains stable 
during short term periods. In this study, the base interest rate is the OCR, thus the 
difference in the 30-day market interest rate is a reasonable measure of the difference in 
OCR after the risk premium is cancelled. Consequently, changes in the 30-day interest 
rate are appropriated to identify the monetary policy shocks. 
 
Bjornland (2008) also noted that the 90-day interest rate is a good indicator when 
measuring monetary policy shocks. In New Zealand, the OCR announcements are 
scheduled eight times a year, which means that there are one and half months between 
consecutive announcements. The 90-day interest rate is not only short enough to reflect 
the changes in monetary policy announcement, but also sufficiently long to cover 
unanticipated changes facing two announcements. Since the exchange rate is focusing on 
long term fluctuation, the 90-day interest rates have sufficient effects on the exchange rate 
movements for the purposes of this study; therefore, the difference in 90-day interest rates 
before and after the OCR announcement can also be used to identify monetary policy 
shocks. In this research, both the 30-day and 90-day interest rates were separately used as 
the independent variable in individual OLS regressions. 
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In order to ascertain the impact of the global financial crisis, a dummy variable was 
introduced to distinguish the periods before and after the recent financial tsunami 
influencing the New Zealand market. According to the OCR announcement from RBNZ, 
although the finance tsunami started in late 2007 the New Zealand money market 
continued to be strong until the second quarter of 2008. The OCR announcement on the 
5
th
 of June 2008 is the first OCR announcement which clearly indicated significant 
influence from the financial tsunami on New Zealand’s money market. In addition, the 
OCR experienced its first drop in five years on the 5
th
 of June 2008; therefore, this study 
regards the observations from the 5
th
 of June 2008 as having been affected by the 
financial tsunami.  
 
3.4 Data Collection 
In order to produce reliable results, daily data were collected from the 17
th
 of March 1999 
to the 10
th
 of June 2010. From this period, daily data for the nominal exchange rate, the 
30-day interest rate and the 90-day interest rate on each OCR announcement day and the 
day before the OCR announcement day were selected. The percentage changes in the 
daily nominal exchange rates of the day before and the announcement day were 
calculated as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the changes in the 30-
day interest rate and the 90-day interest rate, measured by the differences in percentage 
points the day before and on the OCR announcement day.  
 
The Official Cash Rate was first introduced to New Zealand on the 17
th
 of March 1999. 
The RBNZ reviews the OCR eight times in a full year, except in 2001 when there were 
nine reviews, making a total of 92 OCR announcements available during the study period.  
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Since this event study is based on a 24-hour event window before and after the OCR 
announcement, the number of observations had to be reduced from 92 to 90, by removing 
the announcements on the 17
th
 of March 1999 and the 26
th
 of April 2007, for the 
following reasons Since the OCR was introduced on the 17
th
 of March 1999, the 
difference in the initial data was not available, thus the initial announcement is removed.  
Additionally, ANZAC Day is celebrated on the 25
th
 of April, which was the day before 
one of the scheduled OCR announcements in 2007. Since it was a public holiday, there 
was no data available for the 25
th
 ,consequently, the OCR announcement on the 26
th
 of 
April 2007 was also isolated, since there is no data available based on the 24-hour event 
window.  
 
The nominal exchange rate, 30-day interest rate, and 90-day interest rate data were all 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand website. All data were collected on a 
daily basis at 11:10am. The percentage change in the daily exchange rate was calculated 
using the 11:10am exchange rate on the OCR announcement day minus the 11:10am 
exchange rate on the day before the announcement divided by the 11:10am exchange rate 
on the day before the announcement, then multiplied by 100. The percentage point 
change in the short term interest rate was calculated using the 11:10am 30-day interest 
rate (90-day interest rate) on the OCR announcement day minus the 11:10am 30-day 
interest rate (90-day interest rate) on the day before the announcement. A dummy variable 
was applied to distinguish the influence before and after the financial crisis with “0” 
indicating observations from the 21
th
 of April 1999 to the 24
th
 of April 2008 and “1” 
indicating observations from the 5
th
 of June 2008 to the 10
th
 of June 2010. Detailed 
figures are listed in Table A, presented in the appendix to this thesis.  
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Finally, it is important to explain that there was one unscheduled OCR announcement 
during the study period. Following the September 11
th
 2001 terrorist attacks, RBNZ made 
the only unscheduled OCR announcement to date on the 19
th
 of September 2001. In order 
to test whether the unscheduled announcement should be included in the sample, a 
dummy variable “    ” was introduced into the analysis, with “    ” set equal to “1” if 
the observation includes the unscheduled observation on the 19
th
 of Sep 2001 and “    ” 
set equal to “0” if it does not. The regression involving the dummy variable was carried 
out as follows in equation 5: 
 
∆         ∆            Ɛ                         (5) 
 
The results of this test are presented in Table 2, showing two regressions, depending on 
which short-term interest rate is used as the independent variable. In both models, the F-
test points to a joint significance, but the t-test suggests that the “9.11” dummy variable is 
very insignificant. Since there is a lack of any economic theory supporting the dummy 
variable, the t-test is preferred to the F-test in this case. Based on the results of the t-test, 
the dummy variable is not significant in either regression. The results indicate that the 
unscheduled announcement did not significantly change the exchange rate movement, 
therefore the observation on the 19
th
 of September 2001 should not be treated differently 
and the sample should include all 90 observations in this research.  The Durbin-Watson 
(DW) test statistics, which are shown in the last row of the table, are larger than the 
upper-bound of 1.703 (for three regression coefficients and a sample size of 90), which 
indicate that both regressions were free of autocorrelation. 
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Table 2: Testing of Unscheduled Announcement 
 30-days interest rate 90-days interest rate 
  -0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.19 
(0.049) 
   3.48 
(0.009) 
4.19 
(0.0002) 
   1.27 
(0.22) 
1.35 
(0.16) 
   0.08 0.15 
Prob (F-stat.) 0.03 0.001 
DW stat. 1.79 1.72 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
Both VAR and Event Study methods are popular for analysing the relationship between 
monetary policy changes and exchange rate movements with VAR better for estimating 
frequent data series. In New Zealand, the Official Cash Rate is reviewed only eight times 
a year, therefore the Event Study approach is clearly better in this case than the VAR 
approach. The empirical analyses are based on the methodologies used by Zettelmeyer 
(2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006) which adopt OLS and the monetary policy shocks 
are identified by the changes in either the 30-day interest rate or the 90-day interest rate. 
The coefficient of the short term interest rate indicates the percentage changes in the 
exchange rate, based on every 100-basis point increase in the short term interest rate 
within a 24-hour event window. A dummy variable is introduced to analyse the impact of 
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the global financial crisis. Overall, there are 90 observations in the sample, with all data 
collected from the RBNZ website.  
 
The next chapter will discuss the empirical results of this study and address the three 
research questions set out in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapter, the methodology of this research is based on the 
studies of Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006), and examines the 
immediate effects of monetary policy announcements on New Zealand’s exchange rate. 
The immediate effect is analysed by collecting the data that was released about 2 hours 
after each OCR announcement. According to Kearns and Manners (2006), any potential 
reverse impact of the exchange rate on the interest rate can be set aside for two reasons. 
First, the event window is too narrow for other factors to exert a significant influence on 
the exchange rate, and, secondly, the policy decision is made ahead of the announcement. 
Consequently, this study is an event study approach based on a 24-hour event window. 
The results reported in this chapter are consistent with the previous studies in that there 
appears to be no exchange rate puzzle in the New Zealand market and the monetary 
policy shocks have no great impact on the exchange rate. Unfortunately, the influence of 
the global financial crisis is unable to be identified, due to the small number of 
observations during the post-financial crisis period. 
 
4.2 Empirical Results  
The major results of the analysis are presented in Table 3and reveal that the changes in 
the 30-day interest rate and in the 90-day interest rate are both significant at the 95% 
confidence level. It is notable that, in the equivalent regression, the coefficient of the 90-
day interest rate changes is larger than that of the 30-day interest rate changes. This is 
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reasonable since the expectation of the 90-day interest rate covers two monetary policy 
announcements, but the 30-day interest rate refers to only one announcement: the longer 
the maturity period is, the harder it is to predict. The small R
2
 values are consistent with 
both Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006). 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results  
 90 Observations 
30-day Interest Rate 90-day Interest Rate 
Regression ∆        ∆        Ɛ                 ∆        ∆        Ɛ                 
α -0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.18 
(0.07) 
β 2.85 
(0.02) 
3.71 
(0.00) 
   0.06 0.13 
DW 1.78 1.7 
Note: Percentage changes in the exchange rate are based on a 100-basis-point increase in 
the short term interest rate. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
Exchange Rate Puzzle:  
According to the results in Table 3, the coefficients of changes in both the 30-day and 90-
day interest rate are greater than zero. Since the coefficient is positive, the exchange rate 
and interest rate move in the same direction, that is, an increase in the interest rate will 
appreciate the New Zealand dollar. This result is consistent with the standard theory, thus 
46 
 
the exchange rate puzzle does not exist in the New Zealand market during the sample 
period. The finding is consistent with Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006) 
during the previous sample periods in their researches. The DW test statistics, which are 
shown in the last row of the table, are larger than the upper-bound of 1.679 (for two 
regression coefficients and a sample size of 90), which indicate that both regressions were 
free of autocorrelation. 
 
Influence of RBNZ:  
The results in Table 3 also indicate that the effect of monetary policy shocks on the New 
Zealand exchange rate has larger impacts in this research compared with previous studies. 
According to Zettelmeyer (2004), every percentage point increase in the 90-day interest 
rate would lead the New Zealand exchange rate to rise by 2.72 percent, while Kearns and 
Manners (2006) found that for 1 percentage point rise in the 30-day and 90-day interest 
rates, the New Zealand dollar would appreciate by 1.83 percent and 1.97 percent 
respectively. Using the same event study approach, for the same increase in the 30-day 
interest rate and 90-day interest rates, this research has shown increases of 2.85 percent 
and 3.71 percent in the New Zealand exchange rate respectively.  The sample period from 
Kearns and Manners (2006) is between the 17
th
 of March 1999 and the 10
th
 of June 2004 
with 42 observations, but this research has extended the sample period to the 10
th
 of June 
2010, with 90 observations in total. The larger impact on New Zealand’s exchange rate 
could therefore be due to the larger sample size and the influence of the current global 
financial crisis, which began after the Kearns and Manners study.  
 
In general, the Reserve Bank adjusts the OCR by 25-basis-points whenever it makes a 
change. Based on the results, an unanticipated 25-basis-point increase in the 30-day 
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interest rate would increase the exchange rate by about 0.7 percent, while an 
unanticipated 25-basis-point increase on the 90-day interest rate would increase the 
exchange rate by about 0.9 percent, so, overall, the monetary policy shocks have no major 
effects on the New Zealand exchange rate. This result is consistent with previous studies 
such as Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), who noted that monetary policy was important to 
maintaining a stable economic development, but the movements of exchange rate are not 
exclusively determined by monetary policy shocks. In addition, Dalziel (2002) and Karim, 
Lee and Gan (2007) also argued that monetary policy shocks only explain relatively small 
changes in exchange rate movements.  
 
Influence of Financial Tsunami:  
According to OCR announcements and Monetary Policy Statements, the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand considers that the global financial crisis affected the New Zealand market 
from June 2008. The OCR announcement on the 5
th
 of June 2008, for example, 
announced the first official cash rate reduction in five years. Based on this announcement, 
the dummy variable    was used to distinguish between pre- and post-financial crisis 
observations.    is set equal to zero in the pre-financial crisis period (that is, before June 
2008) and equal to 1 in the post-financial crisis period (that is, starting from June 2008). 
  
  is the slope dummy which is measured by multiplying the dummy variable (  ) and 
the independent variable (∆  ).   
 
The intercept dummy is included in equation (6): 
 
∆  = α +   ∆   +      + Ɛ   (6) 
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The slope dummy is included in equations (7): 
 
∆  = α +   ∆   +     
  + Ɛ   (7) 
 
∆   is the percentage change in the nominal exchange rates before and after the 
OCR announcement, with the time interval between t and t-1 equal to 24 
hours. 
   is the coefficient of the changes in the short term interest rate. 
   is the coefficient of the dummy variable. 
∆   is the change of percentage points in the short term interest rates before 
and after the OCR announcement, with the time interval between t and t-1 
equal to 24 hours.  
   is the dummy variable that distinguishes the pre- and post-financial crisis. 
  
 
 is the slope dummy that distinguishes the pre- and post-financial crisis. 
  
  = ∆   *    
Ɛ  is the error term. 
 
According to the results in Table 4 and Table 5, the p-values of coefficients on all dummy 
variables (β2) are all greater than 0.1 indicating that they are all insignificant. Since there 
were only 17 observations available from the 5
th
 of June 2008 to the 10th of June 2010, it 
is possible that there was not enough data available in the post-financial crisis period to 
produce a more significant result; therefore, any influence of the global financial crisis is 
not clearly demonstrated. The DW test statistics, reported in both tables 4 and 5, are 
larger than the upper-bound of 1.703 (for three regression coefficients and a sample size 
of 90), which indicate that both regressions were free of autocorrelation.   
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Table 4: Estimation Results: Intercept Dummy  
 Intercept Dummy  
30-day Interest Rate 90-day Interest Rate 
Regression ∆         ∆        +      + 
Ɛ  
∆         ∆        +      + 
Ɛ  
  -0.13 
(0.2) 
-0.14 
(0.2) 
   2.78 
(0.03) 
3.72 
(0.0) 
   -0.13 
(0.6) 
-0.21 
(0.39) 
   0.06 0.13 
DW stat. 1.78 1.71 
Note: Percentage changes in the exchange rate are based on a 100-basis-point increase in 
the short term interest rate with an intercept dummy. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 5: Estimation Results: Slope Dummy  
 Slope Dummy 
30-day interest rate 90-day interest rate 
Regression ∆         ∆        +     
  + 
Ɛ  
∆         ∆        +     
  + 
Ɛ  
  -0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.18 
(0.06) 
   1.62 
(0.27) 
2.91 
(0.03) 
   3.78 
(0.14) 
2.05 
(0.34) 
   0.08 0.13 
DW stat. 1.87 1.78 
Note: Percentage changes in the exchange rate are based on a 100-basis-point increase in 
the short term interest rate with a slope dummy. P-values are in parentheses. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the empirical results of this study. Overall, the results are consistent 
with previous studies and indicate no exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand. The OLS 
regression test is statistically significant, indicating that monetary policy shocks have no 
major effects on New Zealand’s exchange rate. However, the OLS regression with the 
crisis dummy variable is not statistically significant, so the impact of the global financial 
crisis is not identified.  
 
The next, and final, chapter of this thesis will summarize the results of this research and 
discuss the contributions of this study. Limitations and suggestions for future study will 
also be given. 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
This research has focused on the immediate effect of monetary policy shocks on the New 
Zealand exchange rate. The results indicate that there is no exchange rate puzzle in New 
Zealand during the sample period and the immediate effect of monetary policy shocks on 
New Zealand’s exchange rate is minor. The results are consistent with the standard theory 
and previous studies by Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006). 
 
Although New Zealand markets have been reregulated and improved through economic 
reforms from1984 to 1994, there are still problems. In recent years, a constantly high 
exchange rate, particularly between 2004 and 2008, has created difficulties for New 
Zealand’s export sectors and some commentators have put pressure on the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand to lower the highly appreciated New Zealand dollar. Although there have 
been many previous studies examining the relationship between monetary policy shocks 
and exchange rate movements, there has not been enough research focusing on the 
immediate effect of current monetary policy shocks since the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand adopted the Official Cash Rate as its monetary policy instrument in March 1999. 
This research is carried out to examine the relationship between the monetary policy 
shocks and New Zealand exchange rate movements since that date, including the first 
study of the period after the global financial crisis.   
 
According to the literature, there have been two main methods adopted for the study of 
the effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate. The VAR approach is 
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normally used to inspect the long run dynamic effect between monetary policy and 
exchange rates, while the event study approach is usually used to examine the immediate 
effect between monetary policy and exchange rate. When examining the New Zealand 
money market after March 1999, the event study approach was selected as a more 
appropriate instrument as the OCR announcements are scheduled eight times a year, 
though it could be better to choose the VAR method if the base interest rate was, instead, 
based on a daily update. For the purposes of this study, the percentage difference in the 
daily nominal exchange rate was adopted as the dependent variable in order to indicate 
movements in New Zealand’s exchange rate. The percentage point differences in both the 
30-day interest rate and the 90-day interest rate were calculated separately and used as the 
independent variable in order to indicate the monetary policy shocks. From the 17
th
 of 
March 1999 to the 10
th
 of June 2010, there were 90 observations available, including the 
extraordinary observation on the 19
th
 of September 2001, which is the only unscheduled 
OCR announcement to date (due to the September 11
th
 terrorism attack in the USA). This 
observation was examined using a dummy variable test, which found that the parameter 
estimate was insignificant so, without further support for its isolation, it was retained in 
order to avoid unnecessary loss of information. In addition, a dummy variable 
representing the financial tsunami was used to distinguish the influence of monetary 
policy on the exchange rate before and after the crisis.     
 
Based on the methodology used by Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006), 
an event study approach with a 24-hour event window was chosen. The event in this 
research concerns the monetary policy announcement scheduled by the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, which included both changes and no change in the OCR. In fact there were 
37 changes in the OCR, and 53 announcements of no change during the sample period. 
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Since the decision on each OCR announcement was made ahead of time, it was not 
affected by the exchange rate movement or public news on the announcement day, 
therefore, the instrument variable and news classification techniques adopted in 
Zettelmeyer (2004) were not required. Based on the study of Kearns and Manners (2006), 
changes in the short term interest rate were used to represent the effect of monetary policy 
shocks and, instead of using only the 90-day interest rate, as in Zettelmeyer (2004), this 
research adopted both the 30-day and the 90-day interest rates, separately, as independent 
variables, in the equation. Since the 30-day interest rate has a shorter maturity period and 
only responds to one OCR announcement, the 30-day interest rate is more precise for 
measuring the immediate impact of an unanticipated change in the Official Cash Rate. On 
the other hand, the 90-day interest rate is better related to the exchange rate, since the 
OCR announcement is scheduled eight times a year, and the maturity period of the 90-day 
interest rate may cover two OCR announcements. Since the exchange rate is based on 
long run expectations, the 90-day interest rate, with a longer forecasting period, should 
have a larger influence on the exchange rate movement. This is supported by the results 
showing the coefficient of the percentage point difference on the 90-day interest rate is 
larger than that of the 30-day interest rate. However, it would not be acceptable to employ 
an interest rate with a longer maturity period than 90 days as the longer the maturity 
period, the more external factors effect changes in the interest rate and the harder it is to 
estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks accurately. 
 
According to the present research results, there is no evidence of an exchange rate puzzle 
in New Zealand during the selected sample period, which is consistent with previous 
research by Zettelmeyer (2004) and Kearns and Manners (2006). In addition, the 
monetary policy shocks are shown to have no great impact on the New Zealand’s 
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exchange rate. The results further indicate that every 100-basis-point increase in the 30-
day interest rate lead the New Zealand dollar to appreciate by 2.85while the same 
increase in the 90-day interest rate raised the exchange rate by 3.71%. This is consistent 
with earlier studies which indicate that monetary policy shocks only explain a relatively 
small amount of actual exchange rate movements and supports previous assertions that, 
although monetary policy was important for maintaining inflation and stabilizing 
economic development, changes in the exchange rate are not exclusively determined by 
the monetary policy shocks. Due to the small number of observations in the post-financial 
crisis period, any influence of the global financial crisis could not be identified.  
 
5.2 Contributions of This Study 
The relationship between monetary policy and exchange rate is an important factor for 
countries with a small open economy, such as New Zealand. The monetary policy and 
exchange rate nexus has a direct influence on the import and export sectors which directly 
link to the country’s Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and economic development. 
Since the notable economic reforms of the late 1980s, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
has adopted different instruments to implement their monetary policy, but from March 
1999, the Official Cash Rate (OCR) has been officially adopted. The OCR has been a 
good instrument since it has been introduced, however, there has not been enough 
research focussing on the impact of monetary policy shocks on the New Zealand 
exchange rate during the last decade. Further, previous studies have come to conflicting 
conclusions regarding the existence of an exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand.   
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This study has covered the sample period from March 1999 to June 2010, and, by 
carrying out an Event Study concludes that there appears to be no exchange rate puzzle in 
New Zealand since the OCR was introduced. In addition, the results further indicate that 
the RBNZ has no power to significantly influence the exchange rate by implementing 
monetary policy shocks. Indeed the RBNZ is relatively powerless against the constantly 
high exchange rate; therefore the public should not blame RBNZ for the high valued New 
Zealand dollar. Last, but not least, the results also provide updated information regarding 
the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates to the RBNZ while the public 
also gain better information on how to forecast exchange rate movements when facing 
monetary policy shocks in the future. 
 
5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
According to Kearns and Manners (2006), intraday data could more precisely control for 
endogeneity and external factors that may influence both the nominal exchange rate and 
the retail interest rate, however, data for short term interest rate movements is available 
only on a daily basis. If intraday data on the announcement day were available, the event 
window could be narrowed down further, and the result would be more accurate. 
 
In addition, since the dummy variable for the financial crisis was found to be insignificant, 
it is not clear whether the current financial tsunami has affected the underlying 
relationship between monetary policy shocks and the exchange rate. This limitation was 
partly due to a relatively small sample size for the post-crisis period, with only 17 
observations available after the financial crisis hit the New Zealand market. More reliable 
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estimation results will no doubt be possible when more observations during the post-
financial crisis period become available. This is clearly an opportunity for further study.  
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Appendix  
Table A: The Data for Analysis  
No. 
 
 
OCR 
Announcement 
Date 
OCR 
 
 
∆OCR 
 
 
∆   
 
 
∆       
 
 
∆       
 
 
   
 
 
  
  for 
30-day 
IR 
  
  for 
90-day 
IR 
1 21/04/1999 4.50 0 -0.40 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
2 19/05/1999 4.50 0 -0.79 -0.08 -0.08 0 0 0 
3 30/06/1999 4.50 0 -0.94 0 -0.02 0 0 0 
4 18/08/1999 4.50 0 0.47 0 0.03 0 0 0 
5 29/09/1999 4.50 0 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0 
6 17/11/1999 5.00 0.5 -1.09 0.02 -0.01 0 0 0 
7 19/01/2000 5.25 0.25 -0.65 0.04 0.05 0 0 0 
8 15/03/2000 5.75 0.5 -1.24 -0.08 -0.05 0 0 0 
9 19/04/2000 6.00 0.25 0.00 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 
10 17/05/2000 6.50 0.5 -0.28 0.02 0.05 0 0 0 
11 05/07/2000 6.50 0 -0.43 -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0 
12 16/08/2000 6.50 0 -0.69 -0.02 -0.05 0 0 0 
13 04/10/2000 6.50 0 -0.32 0 0 0 0 0 
14 06/12/2000 6.50 0 -0.73 0 0.04 0 0 0 
15 24/01/2001 6.50 0 -0.47 0 0 0 0 0 
16 14/03/2001 6.25 -0.25 -0.76 -0.11 -0.11 0 0 0 
17 19/04/2001 6.00 -0.25 -0.07 -0.05 -0.14 0 0 0 
18 16/05/2001 5.75 -0.25 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0 0 0 
19 04/07/2001 5.75 0 0.25 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 
20 15/08/2001 5.75 0 0.75 0 0.03 0 0 0 
21 19/09/2001 5.25 -0.5 0.02 -0.31 -0.27 0 0 0 
22 03/10/2001 5.25 0 -0.42 0 -0.01 0 0 0 
23 14/11/2001 4.75 -0.5 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0 0 0 
24 23/01/2002 4.75 0 0.00 0 0.01 0 0 0 
25 20/03/2002 5.00 0.25 -0.57 0.19 0.14 0 0 0 
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26 17/04/2002 5.25 0.25 0.55 -0.01 -0.03 0 0 0 
27 15/05/2002 5.50 0.25 0.50 -0.02 -0.04 0 0 0 
28 03/07/2002 5.75 0.25 0.16 0.01 -0.03 0 0 0 
29 14/08/2002 5.75 0 -1.21 -0.02 -0.04 0 0 0 
30 02/10/2002 5.75 0 1.00 0.02 0 0 0 0 
31 20/11/2002 5.75 0 -0.14 0.01 0 0 0 0 
32 23/01/2003 5.75 0 -1.14 0.01 -0.04 0 0 0 
33 06/03/2003 5.75 0 1.09 0 0.05 0 0 0 
34 24/04/2003 5.50 -0.25 -1.51 -0.23 -0.24 0 0 0 
35 05/06/2003 5.25 -0.25 0.31 0.06 0.05 0 0 0 
36 24/07/2003 5.00 -0.25 1.29 -0.04 -0.01 0 0 0 
37 04/09/2003 5.00 0 -0.05 0 0 0 0 0 
38 23/10/2003 5.00 0 0.35 0 0.01 0 0 0 
39 04/12/2003 5.00 0 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15 0 0 0 
40 29/01/2004 5.25 0.25 -0.46 0.15 0.22 0 0 0 
41 11/03/2004 5.25 0 -2.94 -0.12 -0.15 0 0 0 
42 29/04/2004 5.50 0.25 -1.22 0.12 0.12 0 0 0 
43 10/06/2004 5.75 0.25 -0.96 0.01 0.05 0 0 0 
44 29/07/2004 6.00 0.25 0.21 -0.01 0.04 0 0 0 
45 09/09/2004 6.25 0.25 1.13 0 0.05 0 0 0 
46 28/10/2004 6.50 0.25 -1.39 0.02 -0.03 0 0 0 
47 09/12/2004 6.50 0 -0.10 0.02 0.04 0 0 0 
48 27/01/2005 6.50 0 0.77 -0.05 -0.05 0 0 0 
49 10/03/2005 6.75 0.25 -0.03 0.03 0.12 0 0 0 
50 28/04/2005 6.75 0 0.01 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 
51 09/06/2005 6.75 0 -0.10 -0.01 -0.02 0 0 0 
52 28/07/2005 6.75 0 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 
53 15/09/2005 6.75 0 0.45 0 0.01 0 0 0 
54 27/10/2005 7.00 0.25 -0.62 -0.02 0 0 0 0 
55 08/12/2005 7.25 0.25 -2.19 -0.05 -0.05 0 0 0 
56 26/01/2006 7.25 0 0.44 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 
57 09/03/2006 7.25 0 0.54 0.05 0.02 0 0 0 
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58 27/04/2006 7.25 0 0.85 0 0.03 0 0 0 
59 08/06/2006 7.25 0 0.40 0 -0.01 0 0 0 
60 27/07/2006 7.25 0 -0.58 -0.01 -0.03 0 0 0 
61 14/09/2006 7.25 0 1.68 0.02 0.08 0 0 0 
62 26/10/2006 7.25 0 -0.70 -0.2 -0.18 0 0 0 
63 07/12/2006 7.25 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0 0 0 
64 25/01/2007 7.25 0 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0 0 0 
65 08/03/2007 7.50 0.25 -0.75 0.05 0 0 0 0 
66 07/06/2007 8.00 0.25 0.44 0.16 0.2 0 0 0 
67 26/07/2007 8.25 0.25 -0.41 0.14 0.07 0 0 0 
68 13/09/2007 8.25 0 0.41 -0.07 -0.03 0 0 0 
69 25/10/2007 8.25 0 -0.11 0 -0.01 0 0 0 
70 06/12/2007 8.25 0 0.94 -0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
71 24/01/2008 8.25 0 0.29 -0.03 -0.01 0 0 0 
72 06/03/2008 8.25 0 0.55 -0.03 0.03 0 0 0 
73 24/04/2008 8.25 0 -0.48 0 -0.03 0 0 0 
74 05/06/2008 8.25 0 -1.40 -0.01 0 1 -0.01 0 
75 24/07/2008 8.00 -0.25 -1.90 -0.11 -0.13 1 -0.11 -0.13 
76 11/09/2008 7.50 -0.5 -2.21 -0.28 -0.26 1 -0.28 -0.26 
77 23/10/2008 6.50 -1 -2.59 0.02 0.1 1 0.02 0.1 
78 04/12/2008 5.00 -1.5 0.19 -0.03 0.07 1 -0.03 0.07 
79 29/01/2009 3.50 -1.5 -0.87 -0.22 -0.23 1 -0.22 -0.23 
80 12/03/2009 3.00 -0.5 1.86 0.1 0.3 1 0.1 0.3 
81 30/04/2009 2.50 -0.5 0.84 -0.19 -0.15 1 -0.19 -0.15 
82 11/06/2009 2.50 0 1.18 0.07 0.13 1 0.07 0.13 
83 30/07/2009 2.50 0 -0.99 0 0.01 1 0 0.01 
84 10/09/2009 2.50 0 0.00 0 0.03 1 0 0.03 
85 29/10/2009 2.50 0 -3.13 0 -0.01 1 0 -0.01 
86 10/12/2009 2.50 0 1.75 0 0.01 1 0 0.01 
87 28/01/2010 2.50 0 -0.18 0 0.01 1 0 0.01 
88 11/03/2010 2.50 0 -0.14 0 0.04 1 0 0.04 
89 29/04/2010 2.50 0 0.74 0 -0.01 1 0 -0.01 
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90 10/06/2010 2.75 0.25 0.82 0.1 0.06 1 0.1 0.06 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
